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1 Introduction
Alice and Bob live together. Though fond of each other, they maintain separate
budgets. They have been oered a chance to rent a larger apartment. The
apartment has two extra rooms, a study for Alice and a lounge for Bob. Alice
would be willing to pay $100 a month to have the study and Bob would be
willing to pay $100 a month to have the lounge. Alice would never use the
lounge and Bob would never use the study, but each likes the other to be happy.
For this reason, Alice would be willing to pay $50 a month for Bob to have the
lounge and Bob would be willing to pay $50 a month for Alice to have the study.
The additional rent for the larger apartment is $250 per month. Should they
accept the oer on the grounds that total benets from the larger apartment
are $300, or reject it on the grounds that total benets are only $200?
More generally, how should benet-cost analysis account for the value that
benevolent individuals place on other people's pleasure from public goods?
When adding up the benets to be compared with costs, should we sum the
private valuations, the altruistic valuations, or something else?
An intriguing paper by Viscusi, Magat, and Forrest [26] suggests that bene-
ts from improvements in public health \consist of two components: the private
valuation consumers attach to their own health, plus the altruistic valuation
that other members of society place on their health." Viscusi et al attempted
to measure the two components separately, using a survey in which they asked
subjects to state their willingness to pay for a hypothetical product that would
reduce their personal risk and also asked for their willingness to pay for an
advertising campaign that would result in an equivalent reduction in risk for
a larger population. As the authors point out, even a slight concern for the
well-being of each member of a large population could amount to a substantial
willingness to pay for a public benet. In a sample of citizens of Greensboro,
Aaron and Cherie Raznick Professor of Economics, University of California, Santa Bar-
bara.
1North Carolina, Viscusi and coauthors found that, on average, subjects were
willing to pay about 5 times as much to reduce a specic hazard for all North
Carolinans as to reduce this hazard for themselves alone. For a similar benet
to all U.S. citizens, subjects would be willing to pay about 6 times as much
as for themselves only. Even if these hypothetical claims of altruism are over-
stated, the magnitude of the altruistic component of public benets appears to
be signicant. Thus, the question of how to treat these valuations in benet-cost
analysis becomes a question of the rst order of importance.
Before we turn to general matters, let us to try to resolve the rental dilemma
for Alice and Bob. Suppose that they decide to rent the larger apartment and
split the rent equally. If they take the larger apartment, then on selsh grounds,
Alice is worse o, since she is giving up $125 in return for a study that she
values at only $100. Will this private loss be compensated by an improvement
in Bob's well-being? Bob is now paying an extra $125 in return for a lounge
that he values at $100. So it appears that when she accounts for her concern
for Bob's well-being, she will nd the option of taking the apartment even less
satisfactory. A symmetric argument applies to Bob's consideration of Alice's
well-being. Thus if they base their decision on a comparison of the cost of the
apartment with a measure of total benets which includes the altruistic values
of $50, they are led to an outcome in which both are worse o.1 The story of
Alice and Bob illustrates a general principle. If we are to count the altruistic
benets that each gains from the other's enjoyment of the new apartment, we
should not forget to also count the cost that each attributes to the fact that the
other will have to pay more rent.
In an earlier paper, Bergstrom [2] claimed that in general, when altruism
takes a \purely altruistic" form, the appropriate way to measure benets is to
sum private valuations, excluding altruistic valuations. Bergstrom's argument
is based on the observation that with pure altruism, the marginal rst-order
optimality conditions are the same as those that apply if account is taken only
of the private valuations. Jones-Lee [16] [17], who referred to Bergstrom's result
as \rather arresting," oered a more thorough discussion. Jones-Lee showed that
the same conclusion extends to an interesting case of paternalistic preferences,
and showed that when concern for others is \safety-focussed" rather than purely
altruistic, the appropriate benet measures are intermediate between the private
and social values. In a critical discussion of contingent valuation methods,
Milgrom [20] maintained that the appropriate measure of benets is the sum
of private valuations.2 Hanemann [12] disputed Milgrom's conclusion on the
1For those who would like to see a more formal development of this example, the Appendix
develops this story within the context of a simple utility theory.
2Milgrom's paper appeared in a conference volume, along with an interesting discussion
between Milgrom and several environmental economists who found it dicult to accept the
assertion that altruistic values should be ignored in benet-cost studies.
2grounds that altruistically motivated valuation is as legitimate as valuation for
any other reason.
Johansson [14] suggested that if there is signicant altruism, then benet
measures based on contingent valuation studies may lead to overestimates of the
benets of public projects because subjects may inappropriately include their
altruistic valuations as well as their private valuations. Johansson proposed that
it would be appropriate to ask subjects to state their own willingness to pay for
a public project, conditional on the assumption that all others are taxed at rates
equal to their private valuations.
This paper seeks general principles for evaluating public projects in a society
with altruism. The calculus necessary conditions for a Pareto optimum studied
by Bergstrom, Jones-Lee, and Johansson are not exactly what is needed in
a benet-cost analysis. These conditions allow one to determine whether the
current state is a local Pareto optimum. If the current state satises the relevant
rst and second-order conditions, then we know that no \small" changes can be
Pareto improving. But to satisfy the mission of benet-cost analysis, we need to
consider situations where potential changes are not innitesimal, and also where
neither the status quo nor the alternative is necessarily a Pareto optimum.
2 What Can Benet-Cost Analysis Tell Us?
Before we turn our attention to measuring benets in societies with benevolence,
let us think through the justication for benet-cost studies in an economy with
selsh consumers.
2.1 Utility Possibilities and Potential Pareto Improvement
Without explicit instructions about how to compare one person's benets with
the losses of another, we can not expect benet-cost analysis to tell us whether
a public project should or should not be adopted. The best we can hope for
from benet-cost analysis is to learn whether a project is potentially Pareto
improving.
Consider a community with two selsh people, one private good and m
public goods. An allocation is determined by the quantities of private good
for persons 1 and 2 and the vector y of public goods that is available. The
two people are endowed with a total of W units of private good, which is to
be allocated between consumption for person 1, consumption for person 2, and
inputs for the production of public good. Suppose that the amount of private
goods needed to produce the vector y of public goods is C(y). Then if the supply
of public goods is y, the total amount of private goods to be divided between 1
and 2 is W  C(y). Given the vector y of public goods, each feasible distribution
3of private goods determines a distribution of utilities between persons 1 and 2.
We dene the graph of such utility distributions to be the y-contingent utility
possibility frontier. One such curve is shown as UP(y) in Figure 1.






Suppose that a public project will increase the amounts of public goods
from y to y0 at a cost of some reduction in total private consumption. With
the project in place, there is a new utility possibility frontier UP(y0). In Figure
1, neither of the two curves, UP(y) and UP(y0) lies entirely beneath the other.
Thus there is no unambiguous way to determine which is the better outcome.
Some utility distributions are attainable only if the project is implemented and
others are attainable only if it is not.
Let us suppose that initially the amount of public goods is y and that the
distribution of private goods corresponds to the utility allocation marked A in
the gure. We see that the curve UP(y0) includes points that are above and to
the right of A. This implies that it is possible to change the supply of public
goods from y to y0 and still have enough private goods left over so that both
individuals can be made better o than they were at A. When this is the case,
we say that the project is potentially Pareto improving.
These ideas extend naturally to the case of more than two consumers. Where
xi is private consumption of consumer i, the set of all feasible allocations is
f(x1;:::;xn;y)j
P
xi + C(y)  Wg, where C(y) is the cost in terms of pri-
vate goods of producing the vector y of public goods. The y-contingent utility
possibility frontier in n dimensions is then dened in the obvious way.
Denition 1 Suppose that the initial allocation of private and public goods
is A = (x1;:::;xn;y). A change in the amount of public goods from y to
y0 is potentially Pareto improving if there exists a feasible allocation A0 =
(x0
1;:::;x0
n;y0) such that A0 is Pareto superior to A.
42.2 A Benet-cost Test
Where the initial allocation is A = (x1;:::;xn;y), we dene an individual's
willingness-to-pay for changing the vector of public goods from y to y0 as the
quantity of private goods that she would be willing to sacrice in return for
this change. This number could be either positive or negative, depending on
whether i prefers y0 to y or vice versa.
Denition 2 If the initial allocation is (x;y) = (x1;:::;xn;y), then individual
i's willingness to pay for changing the amount of public goods to y0 is wi where
wi solves the equation Ui(xi   wi;y0) = Ui(xi;y).
For an economy with selsh individuals, a simple benet-cost test determines
whether a change is potentially Pareto improving.
Theorem 1 If individuals are selsh and the initial allocation is (x;y) where P
i xi +C(y) = W, then a change in the amount of public goods from y to y0 is
potentially Pareto improving if and only if the sum of individual willingnesses-
to-pay for the change exceeds the dierence in cost C(y0)   C(y).
A detailed proof of Theorem 1 is found in the Appendix. But the idea
behind the proof is quite simple. If the sum of willingnesses-to-pay exceeds
total cost, then it is possible to change the amount of public goods from y to
y0 and pay for this change by collecting an amount from each individual that is
smaller than her willingness to pay. Doing so constitutes a Pareto improvement.
Conversely, if the change is potentially Pareto improving, there must be a way
to distribute the costs of the change so that nobody is worse o after the project
is implemented and cost shares are assigned. By denition, this implies that
each individual's share of the cost is smaller than his willingness-to-pay for the
project. Since the cost shares add to the total cost of the project it follows that
the project would pass the benet-cost test.
2.3 A Calculus-Based Necessary Condition
Theorem 1 is very general in the sense that it does not depend on preferences
being convex or continuous and it applies whether the change being considered
is large or innitesimal. But the weakness of this theorem is that it only gives
us a way to evaluate projects one at at time. Applying the benet-cost criterion
in this theorem would requires a separate survey of consumers to determine the
merits of every possible public project.
If we are willing to assume that preferences are smooth and convex, then
calculus-based methods allow us to make more sweeping judgments about the
direction of potential Pareto improvements, which depend simply on a com-
parison of marginal costs and marginal willingnesses to pay. The rst order
5necessary condition for ecient provision of public goods was elucidated by
Samuelson [22] and is known as the Samuelson condition. This condition re-
quires that at an interior Pareto optimum, for each public good, the sum of
all consumers' marginal rates of substitution between that public good and the
private goods is equal to the marginal cost of that public good.
While the Samuelson condition can be used to determine whether an existing
allocation is Pareto optimal, this is not exactly the result that is needed for
benet-cost analysis. The task of benet-cost studies is to determine whether
specic changes in the amount of public goods could be nanced in a way that
the outcome is Pareto improving. In a \convex environment," it turns out
that a simple extension of Samuelson's result allows one to determine whether
an increase or decrease in the amount of public goods is potentially Pareto
improving.
Denition 3 At a feasible allocation (x;y), we say that an increase in the
amount of public good j passes (fails) the Samuelson test if at the allocation
(x;y) the sum of marginal rates of substitution between public good j and the
private good is greater than (less than) the marginal cost Cj(y) of public good j.
Under appropriate convexity assumptions, the Samuelson test gives us simple
necessary conditions for an increase or for a decrease in the amount of a public
good to be potentially Pareto improving. A proof of the following result is found
in the Appendix.
Theorem 2 If preferences of each individual are selsh and convex and if the
cost function C(y) is convex in y, then a necessary condition for an increase in
the amount of public goods to be potentially Pareto improving is that an increase
passes the Samuelson test. A necessary condition for a decrease in the amount
of public goods to be potentially Pareto improving is that an increase fails the
Samuelson test.
2.4 Benet-Cost as a First Step
An attractive feature of benet-cost analysis is that it seems to allow analysts
to make policy recommendations about specic public expenditures without
taking a stand on questions of income distribution. This independence of distri-
butional considerations is achieved by focussing on potential rather than actual
Pareto improvements. Eorts to construct a useful benet cost analysis in the
absence of distributional judgments has a long history in economics. In 1939,
Kaldor [18] and Hicks [13] articulated the view that has come to be known as the
New Welfare Economics, and which centers on the \compensation principle."
The compensation principle states that an institutional change constitutes an
improvement if it is possible for the gainers to compensate the losers for their
6losses and still be better o after the change, whether or not the redistribution
actually takes place.3
The modern consensus is that the case for distribution-independent project
evaluation is much weaker than was originally hoped. Samuelson [21] demon-
strated that if the utility possibility sets corresponding to alternative policies
are not nested, then the social orderings implied by these criteria are highly
unsatisfactory. Chipman and Moore point out that in economies with several
private goods and no public goods, nesting of the utility possibility sets re-
quires essentially that preferences be identical and homothetic, or with some
further qualications, of the Gorman polar form. Bergstrom and Cornes [1]
show that for an economy with public goods, utility possibility sets correspond-
ing to amounts of public goods will be nested only under special circumstances
that are formally dual to the Gorman polar form.
It is noteworthy that Hicks' founding manifesto of the New Welfare Eco-
nomics [13], does not appear to advocate acceptance of reforms that pass the
compensation test if compensation is not actually paid. Hicks states that
\The main practical advantage of our line of approach is that
it xes attention on compensation. Every simple economic reform
inicts a loss on some people::: Yet when such reforms have been
carried through in historical fact, the advance has usually been made
amid the clash of opposing interests, so that compensation has not
been given, and economic progress has accumulated a roll of victims,
sucient to give all sound policy a bad name." [13], p. 711
Much of the controversy surrounding the use of the criterion of \potential
Pareto improvement" seems to be avoidable if we think of benet-cost analysis
as only a rst step in a project evaluation. For example, if an increase in the
amount of a public good passes the marginal Samuelson test, then we know that
some increase in the amount of the public good is potentially Pareto improving.
Of course this does not mean that every possible way of implementing the
project is Pareto improving. All we know is that there would be some way of
increasing the amount of this public good and dividing costs so that everyone
benets. The next step in evaluation of the project is to consider alternative
ways of nancing this project and estimating who will then be the winners
and the losers. Incentive problems will normally prevent policy makers from
knowing exactly how much each individual values the project and so estimates
of the distribution of winners and losers will be statistical and not exact. It is
usually not reasonable to expect that literally everyone will be better o after
the change, but may be possible to use available information to ensure that a
3An elegant and enlightening intellectual history of the compensation principle and the
New Welfare Economics is found in Chipman [8]. Chipman and Moore [7] present a rigorous
treatment of these issues, using modern techniques.
7very large fraction of the population benets from the policy and that very few
individuals are signicantly harmed.
There is an interesting asymmetry in the results of a marginal benet-cost
tests. If an increase in the amount of a public good fails the test, then it must be
that there is no way to divide the costs of the project in such a way to achieve
a Pareto improvement. The project can reasonably be described as \special
interest legislation". To make a case in favor of a project that fails the test, one
would need to argue that implementing this project and paying for it with a
specied tax scheme is likely to achieve redistributive goals that for some reason
could not be more eciently achieved through redistribution of private goods.
3 Benevolence and benet-cost
3.1 Altruistic Preferences and Private Values
Let us now apply benet-cost analysis to an economy where some people have
benevolent feelings toward others. We dene i to be purely altruistic to j if i's
sympathy for j is in agreement with j's perception of her own well-being. This
notion is especially easy to formulate in a model with some \private goods"
and some \public goods." Let xi be the vector of private goods consumed
by person i and let y be the vector of public goods supplied. An allocation
(x;y) = (x1;:::;xn;y) species the private consumption of each i and the vector
of public goods available to the entire community. For each i, let there be a
private utility function vi(xi;y) representing i's private preferences. We say
person i is purely altruistic if i has preferences over allocations that can be
represented by a \social utility function"
Ui(x;y) = Ui (v1(x1;y);:::;vn(xn;y)) (1)
where Ui is an increasing function of vi and a non-decreasing function of vj for
all j 6= i.4
We can dene person i's private value for a change in the amount of public
goods as i's willingness to pay for the change, accounting only for i's private
utility.
Denition 4 If person i has private consumption xi, then i's private value for
the change from y to y0 units of public goods is the solution wi to the equation
vi (xi   wi;y0) = vi(xi;y).
4Bergstrom [3] and [4] shows that under reasonable conditions, the existence of a utility
representation of the form (1) is implied by the existence of utility functions such that for
each i, Ui depends on i's private utility vi(xi;y) and the altruistic utilities, Uj of all other
individuals
83.2 A Private Values benet-cost Test
Where preferences are purely altruistic, we can dene a private values benet-
cost test as follows.
Denition 5 Suppose that the initial allocation in an economy is (x;y). A
public project that changes the amount of public goods from y to y0 passes the
private value benet-cost test if the sum of all persons' private values for the
change from y to y0 units of public goods exceeds the cost dierence C(y0) C(y).
We will say that a project is potentially privately improving if it is possible
to implement the project and pay for it in such a way that somebody's private
utility increases and nobody's private utility decreases. More formally:
Denition 6 If the initial allocation is (x;y), a change in the amount of public
goods from y to y0 is potentially privately improving if there exists a feasible
allocation (x0;y0) such that vi(x0
i;y0)  vi(xi;y) for all i with strict inequality
for some i.
The same reasoning that established Theorem 1 shows that a project is
potentially privately improving if and only if the sum of private values for the
project exceeds its total cost. Since the social utility functions Ui are increasing
in vi and nondecreasing in vj for all j 6= i, it follows that an increase in all of the
private utilities vj is a sucient condition for an increase in each of the social
utilities Ui. Therefore we can conclude that:
Remark 1 If preferences are purely altruistic, then a change in the amount of
public goods is potentially Pareto improving if it passes the private value benet-
cost test.
3.3 Sucient but not Necessary
Although any project that passes the private value benet-cost test is poten-
tially Pareto improving, the converse is not true. When altruism is present, the
private values benet-cost test is sometimes \too demanding" in the sense that
it rejects potentially Pareto improving changes. Because individuals care about
the well-being of others, there may be Pareto improvements in which reductions
in private utility for some individuals are compensated by increases in private
utilities for others whom they care about.
Figure 2 illustrates a potentially Pareto improving change that fails the
private value benet-cost test. The gure displays private utilities vi on the
axes. The curve UP(y) shows the private utility distributions attainable if
the amount of public good is y. The point A = (v1(x1;y);v2(x2;y)) is the
distribution of private utilities in the initial allocation. The area V + above and
9to the right of the dashed lines shows all of the \privately improving" outcomes
where every consumer's private utility is higher than at the point A. The area
above the curve U1U1 represents combinations of v1 and v2 that person 1 prefers
to the outcome A and the area above U2U2 represents combinations of v1 and v2
that person 2 prefers to A, taking account of altruistic preferences. The private
utility distributions corresponding to outcomes that that are Pareto superior to
A are those that are above both of these two curves, which is the area above
the curve, U2AU1.











A project that changes the supply of public goods from y to y0 passes the
private value benet-cost test if and only if the y0-contingent utility possibility
frontier UP(y0) intersects the region V +. In Figure 2, the curve UP(y0) does
not intersect V +, but does pass through the region above the curve U2AU1.
Therefore a change in the amount of public goods from y to y0 fails the private
value benet-cost test, but is potentially Pareto improving.
Remark 2 With purely altruistic preferences, the private value benet-cost test
is not a necessary condition for a change in the amount of public goods to be
potentially Pareto improving.
Indeed in Figure 2, we see that the y-contingent utility utility possibility
curve UP(y) also intersects the region above U2AU1, which means that it would
be possible to achieve a Pareto improvement simply by redistributing private
income, without a change in the amount of public goods.
On reection, it is apparent that if a Pareto improvement can be accom-
plished by redistribution of private goods, then even an entirely wasteful (but
small) change in public expenditure could qualify as potentially Pareto improv-
ing. This suggests that if we seek useful benet-cost criteria, we need to consider
changes that start from an allocation from which no Pareto improvements can
10be achieved simply redistributing private goods. It will be useful to dene dis-
tributionally ecient allocations as follows:
Denition 7 An allocation (x;y) is distributionally ecient if there is no fea-
sible allocation (x0;y) that is Pareto superior to (x;y).
In Figure 3, the allocation A is distributionally ecient. In this gure allo-
cations that are Pareto superior to A must lie in the region that is above the two
curves U1U1 and U2U2. Since the curve UP(y) does not cross into this region,
there is no way to achieve a Pareto improvement simply by redistribution of
private goods.











Even if the initial allocation is distributionally ecient, passing the private
value benet-cost test is not a necessary condition for a change in the amount
of public goods to be potentially Pareto improving. We can see this from the
example in Figure 3. In this diagram, the y0-contingent utility possibility frontier
does not intersect V + and hence y0 does not pass the private values benet-cost
test. Nevertheless, since UP(y0) intersects the area above the two curves U1U1
and U2U2, there exists a feasible allocation (x0;y0) that is Pareto superior to
(x;y). Thus a change in the public goods supply from y to y0 is potentially
Pareto improving.
As this example illustrates, we can not hope to nd a benet-cost test that
is based only on private values and that yields \global" necessary and sucient
conditions for potential Pareto improvement.
3.4 A Useful Necessary Condition
The previous section showed that in an economy with pure altruism, passing
the private value benet-cost test is a sucient but not a necessary condition
11for a project to be potentially Pareto improving. In fact, we showed that even
if the initial allocation is distributionally ecient, there may be changes in the
amount of the public goods that fail the private value benet-cost test, but
are potentially Pareto improving. Nevertheless, it turns out that, subject to
some fairly weak technical assumptions, there is a simple marginal condition
that depends only on private evaluations and is necessary for a change to be
potentially Pareto improving. The following denitions are helpful for stating
this result.
Denition 8 Consumer i's private marginal rate of substitution between public
good j and private goods is the ratio mij(xi;y) between the partial derivative of
vi(xi;y) with respect to yj and the partial derivative of vi(xi;y) with respect to
y.
We dene the desired condition as follows.
Denition 9 At the allocation (x;y), public good j is said to pass the private
values Samuelson test if
X
i
mij(x;y) > Cj(y): (2)
and to fail the private values Samuelson test if if this inequality is reversed.
The necessary condition that we seek will be valid under the following as-
sumptions.
A. 1 Each consumer i has purely altruistic preferences, with a social utility
function Ui(v1;:::;vn) that is quasi-concave, dierentiable, nondecreasing in
all vj and increasing in vi.
A. 2 The private utility functions vi(xi;y) are concave, dierentiable, and in-
creasing in xi.
A. 3 The set of feasible allocations is f(x;y)j
P
i xi + C(y)  Wg, where the
cost function C(y) > 0 is convex in y.
Theorem 3 In an economy where Assumptions A.1-A.3 are satised and where
the initial allocation ( x;  y) is distributionally ecient, a necessary condition for
an increase in the amount of public good j to be potentially Pareto improving is
that public good j does not fail the private values Samuelson test. Similarly, a
necessary condition for a decrease in the amount of public good j to be potentially
Pareto improving is that public good j does not pass the private values Samuelson
test.
12Proof or Theorem 3. The rst claim of this theorem is that if public
good j fails the private values Samuelson test, then no increase in the amount
of j can be potentially Pareto improving. To show this, let ( x;  y) be the initial
allocation. If public good j fails the Samuelson test, then, as is demonstrated in
Lemma 1 of the Appendix, there is some decrease in the amount of public good
j that is potentially Pareto improving. That is, there exists a feasible allocation
(x;y) such that yj <  y, yk =  yk for k 6= j and (x;y) is Pareto superior to
( x;  y). Suppose that an increase in the amount of public good j from  yj to y0
j
is potentially Pareto improving. Then there exists a feasible allocation (x0;y0)
that is Pareto superior to ( x;  y). Since y0
j >  yj > yj, there is some  2 (0;1)
such that  y = y+(1 )y0. Consider the allocation (x;y)+(1 )(x0;y0). The
assumption that C is a convex function implies that this allocation is feasible.
Since (x;y) and (x0;y0) are both Pareto superior to ( x;  y), assumptions in A.1
and A.2 on the convexity of preferences imply that (x;y) + (1   )(x0;y0) =
(x + (1   )x0;  y) is Pareto to superior to ( x;  y). But this contradicts the
assumption that the initial allocation is distributionally ecient. It follows that
if an increase in the amount public good j fails the private values Samuelson
test, then a small decrease in the amount of public goods is potentially Pareto
improving and no increase in the amount of public goods can be potentially
Pareto improving.
A parallel line of reasoning shows that if an increase in the amount of a
public goods passes the private values Samuelson test, then a small increase in
the amount that public good is potentially Pareto improving and no decrease is
potentially Pareto improving.
3.5 A Puzzling Observation Explained
Section 3.3 showed an example where an increase in the amount of a public good
is potentially Pareto improving, even though this change fails a private values
benet-cost test. Consumer 2's altruism towards Consumer 1 is sucient for
him to prefer the new allocation to the old, even though his private utility is
lower after the change.
Since it is possible to achieve a Pareto improvement without increasing pri-
vate utilities of every consumer, how can the private values Samuelson condition,
which accounts only for private marginal rates of substitution, be a necessary
condition for an increase in the amount of a public good to be Pareto improving?
The explanation of this seeming paradox is as follows. The proof of Theo-
rem 3 demonstrates that if the initial allocation is distributionally ecient and
if certain convexity and continuity conditions are satised, then whenever an
increase in the amount of a public good is potentially Pareto improving in terms
of the altruistic utilities Ui, it must be that a decrease in the amount of this
public good is not potentially Pareto improving in terms of the private utilities,
13vi. But a decrease in the amount of a public good will be potentially Pareto
improving in terms of the private utilities if that public good fails the private
values Samuelson condition. Therefore, under the assumptions of Theorem 3,
a necessary condition for an increase in the amount for a public good to be
potentially Pareto improving when altruism is taken into account is that the
public good does not fail the private goods Samuelson condition.
4 Discussion and Applications
What have we learned that can guide policy-makers and practitioners? The
story of Alice and Bob suggests that there is reason to heed Johansson's [14]
warning that ill-formed contingent evaluation studies may yield misleading re-
sults. Imagine that Alice and Bob hired a naive benet cost analyst to decide
whether they should take the new apartment. If the analyst asked each of them,
\How much would you be willing to pay to have the larger apartment?" they
would each reply $150. The analyst would then report total benets of $300 and
recommend that they take the apartment so long as the extra rent did not ex-
ceed $300. But if the rent is more than $200 and is split equally between them,
they will both be worse o if they take the apartment. What went wrong? The
analyst evidently asked the wrong question. This question encouraged answers
that include the sympathetic value that each places on the other's utility for the
new apartment but neglect the sympathetic cost that each would feel because
the other has to pay more rent.
The analyst might instead have asked each of them. \If the cost of moving
to the new apartment is split equally between you, what is the most that you
yourself would be willing to pay for the larger apartment?" Then each would take
account of the costs as well as the benets to the other, and each would answer
$100. The analyst would then correctly recommend taking the apartment only
if the extra rent did not exceed $200. The symmetry of this example makes
it natural for the decision-maker to propose splitting costs equally. But in less
symmetric circumstances, it would not be obvious what division of costs to
propose. In principle, the analyst could discover potential improvements, but
this might require asking many dierent questions, each of which proposed a
dierent division of costs.
Our results suggest that for many purposes, a simpler approach will suce.
In the case of Alice and Bob, the analyst could ask each of them a single question.
"How much would you be willing to pay for the benets that you yourself realize
from the larger apartment, ignoring any benets to the other person?" Moving
to the larger apartment will be potentially Pareto improving if and only if the
sum of these two measures of benet exceeds the additional cost.
More generally, Theorem 3 tells us that the private values Samuelson test
14can determine the appropriate direction of change in the quantity of any public
good. For this test, marginal benets might be determined by asking a question
like: \How much would you be willing to pay per unit for a small increase in the
amount of this public good ignoring any benets (or costs) that may be accrue
to others.
Benet cost studies based on surveys in which individuals are asked their
willingness to pay for public amenities are routinely used by government agencies
in many countries. As Hanemann [12] and Carson [6] explain, these studies
vary widely in design and in quality. While there has been an energetic debate
over the validity of contingent evaluation studies, Hanemann reviews a body
of evidence that suggests that carefully conducted contingent valuation studies
exhibit reliability and consistency with other measures of willingness to pay.
For some projects that improve public health and safety, it is relatively
easy to distinguish private values from altruistically motivated values. Several
interesting studies have involved interviews of a sample of individuals, who are
asked for their valuations of hypothetical changes in the risk of various adverse
health eects. These studies carefully frame the hypothetical situations so as
to distinguish between subjects' valuations of the eects on their own health
and the value that they place on health benets to others. Viscusi and his
coauthors [26] asked their subjects what they would pay for a product that
would increase their own safety, but not that of others, and then separately asked
about willingness to pay for extending the same benets to a larger population.
Jones-Lee, Hamerton, and Philips [15] asked a sample of British adults about
their willingness to pay for a hypothetical safety device on their own cars that
would increase only the driver's safety. A second question asked about their
willingness to pay for a device that the increased the safety of the passengers
as well as the driver. Dickie and Ulery [11] and Dickie and Gerking [10] asked
parents to state the amount that they would be willing to pay to spare their
own children from illnesses with a specic list of unpleasant systems. They
also asked questions about wilingness to pay to avoid the same symptoms for
themselves and for others outside the family.
There have also been several \revealed preference" studies of willingness to
pay to avoid private hazards. These are catalogued in a recent survey by Viscusi
and Aldy [25] Economists have used data on wages and occupational hazards
to estimate the amount the prices at which individuals will accept risks to their
own life and limb. Other studies have related the reduction in the price of
houses near hazardous wastes to the hazards involved. Others have attempted
to hedonic estimates of the value of additional safety features of automobiles.
These health and safety studies avoid the pitfall of which Johansson warns.
The contingent valuation surveys focus deliberately on the respondents' private
willingness to pay for their own or their childrens' health. Some of these studies
15also elicit separate measures of altruistically motivated willingness to pay. Sim-
ilarly, the revealed preference studies are able to sort out private willingness to
pay from altruistic considerations because they investigate willingness to pay for
private goods, like safer cars, that provide close substitutes for increased safety
resulting from public goods like highway improvements.
But for many public goods, it is not easy to distinguish private valuations
from altruistic values. An especially problematic case is the measurement of
\existence value" of wilderness areas or of endangered species, things which
people may value even if they never expect to see them. Loomis and White [19]
survey a large number of contingent valuation studies of the value of preserving
various animal species. Coursey [9] describes a typical question of such studies
as: \What is the maximum dollar amount your household would be willing
to pay for a program that will lead to a ten percent increase in the whooping
crane population?" A contingent valuation studies by Bowker and Stoll [5] (for
whooping cranes) and a study by Stevens et al [23] (for bald eagles, Atlantic
salmon, wild turkeys, and coyotes) asked how much individuals were willing to
contribute voluntarily to a fund that was set up to benet the targeted animal.
How are we to interpret the answers to Coursey's question? A subject might
believe that this question means either: A) How much would you be willing
to pay for a ten percent increase in the whooping crane population, if this in-
crease depended solely on your own contribution? B) What is the largest tax
increase that you would be willing to accept for you and those like you in order
to accomplish a ten percent increase in the whooping crane population? People
with strong altruistic motives are likely to respond with a much larger answer
to Question A than to Question B. This paper has argued that the concep-
tually appropriate answer for benet cost analysis is the answer to Question
B. Contingent valuation studies might be improved by sharpening the line of
inquiry to clarify whether it is Question A or Question B that is being asked.
It would also be useful to conduct comparative studies designed to determine
whether Coursey's question is usually interpreted as Question A, as Question B
or whether it matters.
There is even more uncertainty about how the subject interprets a question
about the size of voluntary contribution that she is willing to make for a public
good. This was acknowledged by Stevens, More and Glass [24] in a followup
paper to their earlier paper, [23]. The authors re-interviewed subjects of the
earlier study and asked them why they would pay for restoration of animal pop-
ulations. About 40 percent of the subjects responded that they were motivated
by concern for doing their \fair share" to help preserve wildlife. Others were
motivated by the \pleasure of knowing the population would continue to exist",
while others responded that they would \get pleasure from knowing that they
had contributed to a good cause.
16Stevens and his coauthors [24] conclude their followup study by remarking
that \unless motivations underlying CV response are identied, existence value
estimates will be often misinterpreted." This conclusion seems justied. It
would be useful to conduct further studies that investigate subjects' own will-
ingness to pay for an increase in the amount of a public good under explicitly
stated assumptions about whether it is assumed that others are also required
to contribute.
5 Appendix
Alice and Bob with Utility Functions
Suppose that Alice and Bob have \private utility functions" vA(xA;yA) = xA+
100yA and vB(xB;yB) = xB + 100yB where yA is 0 or 1 depending on whether
Alice has the study, yB is 0 or 1 depending on whether Bob has the lounge,
and xi is private consumption of person i. Let Alice and Bob's concern for each
other be registered in \altruistic utility functions" UA(vA;vB) = vA +vB=2 and
UB(vA;vB) = vB +vA=2. Suppose that if they do not take the new apartment,
Alice and Bob will have  xA and  xB, respectively, to spend on other goods. If
they take the new apartment at an additional cost of c and split this cost equally,
then Alices's expenditure on other goods will be x0
A =  xA   p=2 and Bob's will
be x0
B =  xB   p=2. Thus if they do not take the apartment, their private
utilities will be vA =  xA and vB =  xB and if they take the apartment, their
private utilities will be v0
A = x0
A + 100 =  xA + 100   p=2 and vB = x0
B + 100 =
 xB + 100   p=2. Now consider their altruistic utility functions. If they do not
take the apartment, Alice's utility will be UA =  xA +  xB=2 and Bob's utility
will be UB =  xB +  xA=2. If they take the apartment, Alice's utility will be
U0
A =  xA + 100   p=2 + ( xB + 100   p=2)=2 = UA + 150   3p=2 and Bob's
utility will be U0
B =  xB = 100   P=2 + ( xA + 100   p=2)=2 = UB + 150   3p=2.
Therefore they will both benet from taking the apartment if p < $100 and
they will both be worse o if p > $100. Evidently in this example, Alice and
Bob will make a correct decision if and only if they value the apartment at the
sum of their private valuations, ignoring the value that each attributes to the
other's enjoyment.
Proof of Theorem 1
Let (x;y) be the initial allocation and let wi be i's willingness to pay for the
change from y to y0. Suppose that the sum of willingnesses to pay exceeds
C(y0)   C(y). Then there exists  > 0 such that
P
i(wi   ) > C(y0)   C(y).
For each i, let x0
i = xi   (wi   ). From the denition of wi, it follows that for
17each i, Ui(x0










(wi   ) <
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i
xi   (C(y0)   C(y)) (3)




i + C(y0) <
X
i
xi + C(y) < W (4)
Expression 4 implies that that the allocation (x0;y0) is feasible. Therefore if the
sum of willingnesses to pay for the movement from y to y0 exceeds C(y0) C(y),
then the change from y to y0 is potentially Pareto improving.
Conversely, suppose that the change from y to y0 is potentially Pareto im-
proving. Then there exists a feasible allocation (x0;y0) such that Ui(x0
i;y0) 
Ui(xi;y) for all i with strict inequality for some i. From the denition of i's
willingness to pay, wi, it follows that xi  x0
i  wi for all i with strict inequality

















i)  C(y0)   C(y) (6)
Then from Expressions 5 and 6 it follows that
P
wi > C(y0)   C(y).
Proof of Theorem 2
Let ( x;  y) be the initial allocation and suppose that
P
 xi + C( y) = W. If an
increase in the amount of public goods to y >  y is potentially Pareto improving,
then there exists a feasible allocation (x;y) that is Pareto superior to ( x;  y).
Where 0 < t < 1, let xi(t) =  xi + t(xi    xi) and y(t) =  y + t(y    y). Since
preferences are assumed to be convex and (x;y) is Pareto superior to ( x;  y),
it must be that for 0 < t < 1, Ui (xi(t);y(t))  Ui( xi;  y) for all i, with strict






(xi    xi)+
@Ui (xi(t);y(t))
@y
(y   y)  0; (7)
with strict inequality for some i. Since the inequality in 7 holds for all t  0 and
since the marginal utility of private goods is assumed to be positive, it follows
that for all i,
( xi   xi)  mi( xi;  y)(y    y); (8)
18with strict inequality for some i where we dene the marginal rate of substitution
mi( x;  y) =

@vi( xi;  y)
@xi





Adding the inequalities in 8 for all i, we have
X
( xi   xi) > S( x;  y)(y    y) (10)
where S( x;  y) is the Samuelson sum
P
i mi( xi;  y).
Since (x;y) is feasible, it must be that
P
xi + C(y)  W and since
P
 xi +
C( y) = W, it follows that
X
( xi   xi)  C(y)   C( y) (11)
The assumption that C0(y) is nondecreasing implies that C(y) C( y)  C0( y)(y 
 y). Therefore it must be that S( x;  y) > C0( y)(y    y).
Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 If an increase in the amount of public good j fails the private values
Samuelson test, then some decrease in the amount of public good j is potentially
Pareto improving.
The idea of the proof is simple and plausible. If the sum of marginal rates of
substitution for a public good is less than its marginal cost, then the supply of
the public good can be reduced by a small amount and the public goods saved
will be more than enough to compensate every consumer for the loss of public
goods. We show this formally as follows.
Let ( x;  y) be the initial allocation and suppose that an increase in yj fails
the Samuelson test. Let  mij be i's private marginal rate of substitution between
public good j and private goods at this allocation. Since
P
i  mij < Cj( y), there
exists  > 0 such that
P
i( mij + ) < Cj( y). For t > 0, dene the allocation
(x(t);y(t)) so that xi(t) =  xi + ( mij + )t and yj(t) = yj   t. This allocation
corresponds to a decrease of t in the amount of public goods compensated by
an increase of ( mij + )t in each i's private consumption. For each consumer i,
dene ~ vi(t) = vi(xi(t);y(t). Since  mij +  >  mij, it is not hard to show that
the derivative of ~ vi(t) is positive at t = 0 and therefore for some t > 0 and all
i, ~ vi(t) = vi(xi(t);y(t)) > vi( xi;  y).
The allocation (x(t);y(t)) is also feasible. Since
P






 xi + t( mi + ) <
X
i
xi + tC0( y): (12)
The assumption that C(y) is a convex function implies that C( y) C( y t) 






 xi + C( y)   C( y   t) (13)
Since y(t) = y   t, it follows from Expression 13 that
X
xi(t) + C(y(t)) <
X
 xi + C( y) = W; (14)
which implies that the allocation (x(t);y(t)) is feasible. Since this allocation
is feasible and privately preferred by all i to ( x;  y), it follows that a decrease in
the amount of public goods from  y to  y   t is potentially Pareto improving.
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